skill-system-dashboard
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script
scripts/generate.pyexplicitly searches for and reads.envand.env.localfiles to extract theDATABASE_URL. Accessing environment files is a sensitive operation that poses a risk of credential exposure, especially if error messages containing the connection string are captured in the output. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate.pyusessubprocess.runto execute a local Python script (graph_cli.py). The path to this script is constructed using the user-provided--targetargument, which could potentially be manipulated to target unintended files. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate.pyperforms dynamic SQL execution using f-strings (e.g.,f"SELECT count(*) FROM {tbl}"). While the table names are retrieved from the database's own metadata, this pattern of query construction is a security anti-pattern. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from various sources without sanitization.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/generate.pyreads data from.tkt/(YAML),skills/(YAML),.memory/(JSON), and a PostgreSQL database. - Boundary markers: The script does not implement any boundary markers or instructions to delimit ingested content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file system read/write (
fs.read,fs.write), process execution (proc.exec), and database access (db.read). - Sanitization: No significant sanitization or escaping is performed on content such as ticket titles, memory previews, or skill descriptions before they are embedded into the HTML dashboard output.
Audit Metadata