skill-system-eda
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The function
_read_graph_payloadinscripts/eda.pyusestorch.loadto process input graph files. By default, this function employs thepicklemodule, which is known to be insecure and can execute arbitrary code embedded in a malicious file. Since this skill is intended to process external datasets, this represents a significant attack surface if a user provides a compromised graph file. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/eda.pyusessubprocess.runto call an external memory storage utility (mem.py). While it targets a script from a known dependency (skill-system-memory), the execution of external processes from the agent environment increases the complexity of the security boundary. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
graph-vizoperation inscripts/eda.pygenerates an HTML artifact that fetches the D3.js library fromcdn.jsdelivr.net. While this is a well-known and trusted CDN, the inclusion of external scripts in generated files is noted as a remote reference. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data sources (transcripts, CSV fields, annotations), creating a surface for indirect injection. \n
- Ingestion points: Raw text from audio transcripts, categorical data values, and image labels are read in
scripts/eda.py. \n - Boundary markers: Absent; data is directly interpolated into the markdown
report.mdandprofile.yaml. \n - Capability inventory: The skill has
fs.writeto create report artifacts andproc.execto run memory scripts. \n - Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the ingested text before it is written to outputs.
Audit Metadata