k8s-check-fix
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the Kubernetes cluster, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads container logs using
kubectl logsand cluster events usingkubectl get eventsinscripts/subcommands/pod.shandscripts/subcommands/events.sh. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to separate the ingested log and event data from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The
fixsub-command inscripts/subcommands/fix.shallows the agent to modify the cluster state, including deleting pods, scaling deployments, and rolling back versions. - Sanitization: The skill mitigates this risk by employing a strict command whitelist and filtering input for shell meta-characters such as semicolons, pipes, and backticks.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
fixsub-command inscripts/subcommands/fix.shdynamically executeskubectlcommands based on AI agent input. This behavior is restricted by a predefined whitelist of allowed verbs (rollout, scale, delete pod, cordon, uncordon) to prevent arbitrary command execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
kubectl,ssh, andjqfor cluster operations. It supports remote cluster management via SSH and implements security best practices by usingprintf %qfor argument escaping to prevent command injection on the target system.
Audit Metadata