aap-automation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to clone and install the core MCP server from an external GitHub repository (https://github.com/sibilleb/AAP-Enterprise-MCP-Server) that does not belong to the skill author or a recognized trusted organization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides the run_adhoc_command and run_job tools, which enable the agent to execute Ansible modules and playbooks directly on managed infrastructure. This represents a significant capability for command execution on remote hosts.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Through the run_adhoc_command tool, the agent can trigger arbitrary module execution on remote target systems, which constitutes a form of remote code execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks by processing data from the managed environment.
  • Ingestion points: The skill ingests potentially untrusted data via tools such as get_host_facts, job_logs, get_project_update_logs, and search_galaxy_collections (found in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters defined to prevent the agent from following commands that might be embedded in the retrieved logs or host facts.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful write and execution capabilities, including run_job, run_adhoc_command, create_inventory, and create_project (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism for sanitizing or escaping the data fetched from the AAP environment before it is used in the agent's context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 2, 2026, 03:55 PM