aap-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user to clone and install the core MCP server from an external GitHub repository (https://github.com/sibilleb/AAP-Enterprise-MCP-Server) that does not belong to the skill author or a recognized trusted organization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides the
run_adhoc_commandandrun_jobtools, which enable the agent to execute Ansible modules and playbooks directly on managed infrastructure. This represents a significant capability for command execution on remote hosts. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Through the
run_adhoc_commandtool, the agent can trigger arbitrary module execution on remote target systems, which constitutes a form of remote code execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks by processing data from the managed environment.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests potentially untrusted data via tools such as
get_host_facts,job_logs,get_project_update_logs, andsearch_galaxy_collections(found in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters defined to prevent the agent from following commands that might be embedded in the retrieved logs or host facts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful write and execution capabilities, including
run_job,run_adhoc_command,create_inventory, andcreate_project(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism for sanitizing or escaping the data fetched from the AAP environment before it is used in the agent's context.
Audit Metadata