blender-3d-viz
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill includes an
execute_blender_codetool inSKILL.mdthat allows the agent to run arbitrary Python code within the Blender application environment. This capability can be exploited if the agent is manipulated into executing malicious logic. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Installation instructions in
quickstart.mddirect users to download and install a script from an external third-party repository (github.com/ahujasid/blender-mcp). Additionally,SKILL.mdspecifies the use ofuvxto download and run theblender-mcpcommunity package, which is not verified. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process network discovery data (CDP/LLDP) as described in
SKILL.md. This data may contain untrusted strings, such as device hostnames, which could influence the agent's behavior when generating Python commands. Evidence: 1. Ingestion: CDP/LLDP neighbor data parsed from integrated skills (referenced inSKILL.md). 2. Boundary markers: Absent; no safety instructions or delimiters are used to wrap external data. 3. Capability inventory:execute_blender_code(arbitrary Python exec) and file-write capabilities for image export inSKILL.md. 4. Sanitization: Absent; hostnames are classified for coloring but are not sanitized before being used in tool operations. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
execute_blender_codetool inSKILL.mdenables runtime execution of dynamically generated Python scripts, making it difficult to verify the security of the commands being run. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frontmatter in
SKILL.mdrequirespython3anduvxbinaries to execute shell commands for the MCP server connection.
Audit Metadata