fortimanager-ops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from an external FortiManager instance and ServiceNow environment.
- Ingestion points: External data is introduced into the agent's context through tools such as
fmg_get_policy_package,fmg_resolve_object,fmg_search_rules, andfmg_check_change_recordas described in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to differentiate between its system instructions and potentially malicious content embedded in firewall rule names, comments, or object definitions.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes high-privilege tools such as
fmg_install_packagewhich can modify production firewall configurations, as well as recursive resolution and network communication via the MCP server. - Sanitization: The skill lacks instructions for the agent to sanitize or validate retrieved configuration data before using it in decision-making or subsequent command execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on an external Model Context Protocol (MCP) server defined by the environment variable
$FORTINET_MCP_CMD. While this is a common integration pattern for agent platforms, it involves the execution of a runtime-defined command which could be pointed to arbitrary executables depending on the host environment configuration.
Audit Metadata