fortimanager-ops

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from an external FortiManager instance and ServiceNow environment.
  • Ingestion points: External data is introduced into the agent's context through tools such as fmg_get_policy_package, fmg_resolve_object, fmg_search_rules, and fmg_check_change_record as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to differentiate between its system instructions and potentially malicious content embedded in firewall rule names, comments, or object definitions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill includes high-privilege tools such as fmg_install_package which can modify production firewall configurations, as well as recursive resolution and network communication via the MCP server.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks instructions for the agent to sanitize or validate retrieved configuration data before using it in decision-making or subsequent command execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on an external Model Context Protocol (MCP) server defined by the environment variable $FORTINET_MCP_CMD. While this is a common integration pattern for agent platforms, it involves the execution of a runtime-defined command which could be pointed to arbitrary executables depending on the host environment configuration.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 2, 2026, 03:55 PM