amq-spec
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdrequire the agent to interpolate user-provided inputs—including the topic name, partner handle, and problem description—directly into shell commands for theamqutility. For example,amq send --to <partner> --kind question --labels workflow:spec,phase:request --thread spec/<topic> --subject "Spec: <topic>" --body "<problem>"is used for initialization. If these inputs are not properly sanitized by the platform, a malicious user could provide crafted strings containing shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates multi-agent coordination by reading and processing message bodies sent by external agents via the AMQ system.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through the
amq drain --include-bodyandamq thread --include-bodycommands as specified inSKILL.mdandreferences/spec-workflow.md. - Boundary markers: The workflow utilizes specific labels and kinds (e.g.,
workflow:spec,phase:research) to categorize input, though the content of the message body itself is treated as natural language for analysis. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
amq sendfor communication and assumes standard codebase research capabilities (file read access). - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of message bodies; however, the protocol mitigates risk by requiring a mandatory human approval step on a stable
gate/<topic>thread before any execution or implementation occurs.
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