image-generation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The generate_poster.ts script allows reading arbitrary local files through the --assets argument and transmits their contents to external AI provider endpoints (fal.ai and Google). The script does not validate the file type before reading and uploading the data.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions in SKILL.md provide snippets using high-priority keywords such as 'CRITICAL:' and 'MANDATORY:' to influence agent behavior and modify prompt generation logic.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect injection by accepting user-defined prompts and file paths while possessing broad filesystem and network permissions. Evidence includes the use of readFileSync for file access and fetch/upload functions for network communication without sanitization or boundary markers between user data and system commands.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run local scripts using npx ts-node. The implementation of copyToDestination in generate_poster.ts uses the user-provided destination path directly in a copyFileSync operation without sanitization, which could allow files to be written to arbitrary or sensitive system locations via path traversal.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 02:38 PM