agentic-os
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an indirect prompt injection surface by instructing agents to ingest and "explicitly apply" instructions labeled as
rule_changefrom local JSON files in the.agent/learnings/directory. This allows content in project files to override agent behavior without user verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/init-os.shscript modifies the agent's primary instruction files (GEMINI.mdandCLAUDE.md) to append a "Startup" routine that persists across sessions and influences future agent behavior. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The injected startup routine instructs the agent to "automatically execute" tool calls based on the presence of data in
.agent/state/tasks.json. This encourages autonomous behavior triggered by potentially untrusted project data. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The injected instructions reference an external script path (
~/.gemini/skills/heartbeat/scripts/heartbeat.py) that is not included in the skill package, creating an execution dependency on unverified code located in the user's home directory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The initialization script performs unvalidated file copies from sibling directories using glob patterns (
*/templates/eval.json), which could lead to the unintended import of configuration or logic from unrelated or malicious projects in the same workspace.
Audit Metadata