agentic-os
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection by design. It instructs the agent to read
rule_changeentries from local files and apply them as mandatory instructions. - Ingestion points: Reads directives from
.agent/learnings/<skill>.jsonand state from.agent/state/tasks.jsonas specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The agent is commanded to "explicitly apply" rules found in these files without any delimitation or warnings to ignore malicious instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify project configuration files (
CLAUDE.md,GEMINI.md) and execute shell scripts viainit-os.sh. - Sanitization: Absent. Content from the
rule_changefields is treated as authoritative and interpolated directly into the agent's logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/init-os.shscript performs broad filesystem modifications and appends content to the agent's project instructions. - Evidence: The script uses
echo "$HEARTBEAT_INSTRUCTION" >> "$PROJECT_ROOT/GEMINI.md"to persist a startup routine that the user may not have explicitly authorized. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill injects a command into the agent's permanent instructions that attempts to execute a Python script located in a hidden directory in the user's home folder.
- Evidence: The
HEARTBEAT_INSTRUCTIONvariable inscripts/init-os.shcontains the commandpython3 ~/.gemini/skills/heartbeat/scripts/heartbeat.py pop. This creates a dependency on an external script whose provenance and safety are not verified by this skill.
Audit Metadata