gemini-use-claude-acp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
claude-delegate.mjssets the environment variableCLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_PERMISSIONSto1. This configuration instructs the delegated Claude agent to execute all tool calls—including arbitrary shell commands and file system modifications—without requiring manual user confirmation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
pnpm dlxto download and execute the@zed-industries/claude-code-acppackage from the npm registry at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection by accepting arbitrary input text and passing it to an agent session with elevated, unattended tool access.
- Ingestion points: Command-line arguments passed to
claude-delegate.mjsare joined into the final prompt text. - Boundary markers: None; the prompt text is interpolated directly into the message without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The delegated agent has access to Claude Code's native capabilities, including full filesystem access and shell command execution, with auto-approval enabled.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the input prompt text.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata