stitch-mcp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the use of
pnpx @_davideast/stitch-mcpas the primary tool for agents. This command downloads and executes code from a non-official, individual-user-scoped NPM package that is not controlled by the skill author or a trusted organization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The CLI's
initcommand is described as handlinggcloudinstallation and credential management. This implies the tool performs high-risk environmental modifications and potentially privileged system commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions include using
curlto download HTML and image assets from remote URLs (generated by the Stitch API) and writing them directly to the local filesystem in the.stitch/designs/directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's "Build Loop" and "Baton" system are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read instructions from
.stitch/next-prompt.mdand context from.stitch/DESIGN.mdand.stitch/SITE.md(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill suggests a structured prompt format (e.g., "PAGE STRUCTURE" blocks) but lacks technical enforcement, delimiters, or explicit warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the ingested files.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses extensive capabilities including network access, file system writes, and the execution of external CLI tools (
pnpx,npx). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of the ingested Markdown files before they influence the agent's next task.
Audit Metadata