gemini-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands to interact with the
geminiCLI, including management tasks likegemini updateandgemini extensions install. It specifically instructs the use of--approval-mode yoloandauto_edit, which allow the agent to perform write operations and command execution without human intervention. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest arbitrary external content (e.g., logs, source code) and pipe it into a sub-agent's prompt context via stdin.
- Ingestion points: Found in SKILL.md through patterns involving piping data to the CLI (e.g.,
cat logs.txt | gemini -p). - Boundary markers: Although the reference templates in
references/*.mduse XML-like wrappers (e.g.,<task>,<scope_guardrails>), these delimiters do not provide strong protection against instructions embedded within the untrusted input data. - Capability inventory: The
geminitool possesses broad capabilities including file modification and shell command execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for the data processed through the pipeline.
Audit Metadata