agent-auth-mcp

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The configuration instructions for Cursor and Claude Desktop suggest using npx @auth/agent-cli to start the MCP server. This command fetches the package from the npm registry at runtime.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By recommending npx, the skill triggers the execution of remote code. The package @auth/agent-cli is not pinned to a specific version, and it originates from a source that is not explicitly linked to the skill's author ('better-auth') per the vendor naming patterns provided.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the user to execute shell commands such as auth-agent mcp and auth-agent mcp --url https://api.example.com to manage the authentication environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its interaction with untrusted external providers.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through the list_capabilities and describe_capability tools, which fetch metadata and schemas from provider URLs.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or explicit warnings to the agent to disregard instructions that might be embedded in the provider's metadata or capability descriptions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools like execute_capability, which can perform operations like 'deploy_app' or 'transfer_money' based on the provider's definition.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the input schemas or provider data before the agent uses them to generate tool calls.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 9, 2026, 11:32 PM