tiangong-wiki-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes system commands using
child_process.spawn,spawnSync, andexecFileSyncto perform core operations: - Installing and updating agent skills through the
npx skills addcommand chain. - Extracting text content from PDF files using system utilities such as
mdlsandstringsinsrc/core/vault.ts. - Performing Git operations (commit, push, rev-parse) within the workspace in
src/daemon/git-journal.ts. - Opening files, directories, or URLs using the host operating system's default handlers like
open,xdg-open, orrundll32.exeinsrc/utils/process.ts. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The application dynamically loads binary SQLite extensions (
libsimple.dylib,libsimple.so, orsimple.dll) at runtime. These paths are programmatically computed insrc/core/sqlite-extensions.tsbased on the detected operating system and CPU architecture. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an agentic workflow that ingests untrusted data from 'vault' files (PDF, Word, PPTX, etc.). While the skill uses structured JSON manifests and schema validation for the agent's output, the combination of processing untrusted content and having capabilities like command execution and file system modification creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides mechanisms to fetch and install additional functionality from external sources, specifically GitHub repositories, during the setup and skill management processes.
Audit Metadata