ss-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a Node.js script (
resolve-context.mjs) located at a variable path (<installed-ss-resolve>). Executing code from paths determined at runtime or provided as placeholders can be exploited if the agent is misled into targeting a malicious file. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-supplied design references and configuration values to generate a
STYLESEED.mdfile. This file is then processed by a script whose output (effective-rules.md) is read back into the agent's context. This creates a loop where malicious instructions embedded in untrusted design data could potentially influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points: User-provided product descriptions, brand requirements, and external references in Step 1-7.
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings when the agent reads the generated
effective-rules.mdbundle. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,WebFetch, andWritetools. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the content of user-provided strings before they are written to the design lock file.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool to run Node.js scripts and context resolution logic, which represents a high-privilege capability within the agent environment.
Audit Metadata