document-hunter
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a compressed ZIP archive containing the RECAP browser extension from an external GitHub repository not identified as a pre-vetted or trusted source.
- Evidence:
curl -L "https://github.com/freelawproject/recap-chrome/releases/download/2.8.6/chrome-release.zip" -o recap.zipin bothSKILL.mdandsite-patterns.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill extracts the downloaded ZIP archive into the agent's tools directory, allowing external binaries/scripts to be loaded and used by the browser automation environment.
- Evidence:
unzip recap.zip -d recap-extensioninSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes Python scripts (
download-documents.py) at runtime to perform complex browser automation and file system operations. - Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdto "Generate and run a Python script" combined with the templates provided insite-patterns.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data (HTML content, page titles, and metadata) from various external websites using Playwright.
- Ingestion points: Document links and titles extracted from DocumentCloud, CourtListener, Scribd, and other archives in
site-patterns.md. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or sanitization logic is present to distinguish between retrieved data and instructional content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to Bash, Write, Read, Glob, and can execute generated Python scripts.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted external content is implemented before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata