suno-engineer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to extract directory paths using the
Bashtool with the commanddirname $(dirname $TRACK_PATH). Since$TRACK_PATHis sourced from user-provided$ARGUMENTS, an attacker can perform command injection by providing a path that includes shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,|, or backticks), potentially leading to arbitrary code execution on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and acting upon data from untrusted local files.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads the
README.mdfrom the album directory and asuno-preferences.mdoverride file to define its prompting strategy and style. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any delimiters or safety markers to isolate the content of these external files from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including
Bash,Write, andEdittools, which could be abused if malicious instructions are encountered in the project files. - Sanitization: Content retrieved from project files is incorporated into the prompt generation workflow without validation or sanitization.
- [SAFE]: The skill utilizes the
bitwize-music-mcptool, which is an internal resource belonging to the skill's author,bitwize-music-studio.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata