suno-engineer

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to extract directory paths using the Bash tool with the command dirname $(dirname $TRACK_PATH). Since $TRACK_PATH is sourced from user-provided $ARGUMENTS, an attacker can perform command injection by providing a path that includes shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, |, or backticks), potentially leading to arbitrary code execution on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and acting upon data from untrusted local files.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads the README.md from the album directory and a suno-preferences.md override file to define its prompting strategy and style.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any delimiters or safety markers to isolate the content of these external files from the agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities, including Bash, Write, and Edit tools, which could be abused if malicious instructions are encountered in the project files.
  • Sanitization: Content retrieved from project files is incorporated into the prompt generation workflow without validation or sanitization.
  • [SAFE]: The skill utilizes the bitwize-music-mcp tool, which is an internal resource belonging to the skill's author, bitwize-music-studio.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 14, 2026, 06:29 AM