ingest-github
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses variables parsed from a user-provided GitHub URL (owner, repo, ref, and slug) directly in Bash commands such as
mkdirandgh repo clone. If these components are not properly sanitized, a malicious URL could be used to inject arbitrary shell commands (e.g.,github.com/owner/$(whoami)). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes content from untrusted external repositories. An attacker could place malicious instructions inside CSS, JavaScript, or JSON files in a repository which might be executed or followed by the agent during the extraction phase.
- Ingestion points: Step 3 and 4 in
SKILL.md(viaGlobandReadoperations on the cloned repository contents). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within the files.
- Capability inventory:
Write,Bash(mkdir, gh, rm, realpath, basename), andReadtools are available. - Sanitization: Absent. No filtering or validation of the ingested file content is performed before processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs remote operations by cloning repositories from
github.com. While GitHub is a well-known service, the skill downloads and stores untrusted code in the/tmpdirectory for analysis.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata