bmad-agent-architect
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's activation sequence involves executing entries from
activation_steps_prependandactivation_steps_append. These fields are sourced from configuration files within the project root. If a project contains malicious entries in these lists, the agent will execute them automatically during setup.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to useuv runto execute Python scripts found in the project's_bmad/scripts/directory. This allows for the execution of arbitrary code provided by the repository being worked on.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources within the project directory.\n - Ingestion points: Merges data from
customize.tomland project-specific override files (.tomland.user.toml). It also loads file contents into memory viapersistent_factsusing path globs.\n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to ensure the agent treats this external content strictly as data.\n
- Capability inventory: Includes file reading, shell command execution via
uv, and skill installation vianpx.\n - Sanitization: The skill does not define any validation or filtering logic for the merged configuration or the facts loaded from the filesystem.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill prompts the user to use
npx skills addto fetch additional components from the developer's repository if they are not already present. This pattern facilitates the download and installation of external code into the environment.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata