bmad-edit-prd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands and Python scripts as part of its workflow management.
- It runs
python3 {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.pyto merge configuration settings fromcustomize.tomland user overrides. - In
step-e-01-discovery.md, it executesls -tto locate recent validation reports in the file system. - In
step-e-04-complete.md, it provides anon_completehook that allows executing a resolved command string as a terminal instruction. This is a feature that could be exploited if an attacker can modify the local.tomlconfiguration files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes untrusted user data (PRDs and validation reports) to drive the editing workflow.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads the content of PRD files (
{prd_file_path}) instep-e-01-discovery.mdand validation reports ({validation_report_path}) instep-e-02-review.mdto identify issues and plan changes. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters are used when the agent reads these files. There are no instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the PRD content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
ls,python3), write to the file system, and invoke other skills (bmad-advanced-elicitation,bmad-party-mode,bmad-validate-prd). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested text is performed before it is processed by the agent to create the 'Deep Review' or 'Edit' plans.
Audit Metadata