skills/bmad-labs/skills/bmad-edit-prd/Gen Agent Trust Hub

bmad-edit-prd

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands and Python scripts as part of its workflow management.
  • It runs python3 {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.py to merge configuration settings from customize.toml and user overrides.
  • In step-e-01-discovery.md, it executes ls -t to locate recent validation reports in the file system.
  • In step-e-04-complete.md, it provides an on_complete hook that allows executing a resolved command string as a terminal instruction. This is a feature that could be exploited if an attacker can modify the local .toml configuration files.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes untrusted user data (PRDs and validation reports) to drive the editing workflow.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads the content of PRD files ({prd_file_path}) in step-e-01-discovery.md and validation reports ({validation_report_path}) in step-e-02-review.md to identify issues and plan changes.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters are used when the agent reads these files. There are no instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the PRD content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (ls, python3), write to the file system, and invoke other skills (bmad-advanced-elicitation, bmad-party-mode, bmad-validate-prd).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested text is performed before it is processed by the agent to create the 'Deep Review' or 'Edit' plans.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 10, 2026, 05:26 PM