bmad-qa-generate-e2e-tests

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using the pattern python3 {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.py during both the activation and completion phases. This execution relies on scripts located within the project's own directory structure.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow is designed to execute arbitrary steps defined in activation_steps_prepend, activation_steps_append, and on_complete. These steps are loaded from configuration files in the project root (_bmad/custom/), allowing the project content to dictate executable actions for the agent.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By executing code and loading configurations directly from the {project-root}, the skill allows for the execution of untrusted logic if the repository being worked on is cloned from an external or malicious source. This represents a supply-chain risk where the repository author can gain command execution privileges on the user's system via the agent.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of untrusted project data.\n
  • Ingestion points: Reads customize.toml, project-specific .toml overrides, and persistent_facts which includes project-context.md globs.\n
  • Boundary markers: None identified; external content is treated as foundational context.\n
  • Capability inventory: Includes Python script execution, arbitrary workflow step execution, and test command execution.\n
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the ingested configuration or facts before they influence agent behavior.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 10, 2026, 05:26 PM