bmad-qa-generate-e2e-tests
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using the pattern
python3 {project-root}/_bmad/scripts/resolve_customization.pyduring both the activation and completion phases. This execution relies on scripts located within the project's own directory structure.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow is designed to execute arbitrary steps defined inactivation_steps_prepend,activation_steps_append, andon_complete. These steps are loaded from configuration files in the project root (_bmad/custom/), allowing the project content to dictate executable actions for the agent.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By executing code and loading configurations directly from the{project-root}, the skill allows for the execution of untrusted logic if the repository being worked on is cloned from an external or malicious source. This represents a supply-chain risk where the repository author can gain command execution privileges on the user's system via the agent.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of untrusted project data.\n - Ingestion points: Reads
customize.toml, project-specific.tomloverrides, andpersistent_factswhich includesproject-context.mdglobs.\n - Boundary markers: None identified; external content is treated as foundational context.\n
- Capability inventory: Includes Python script execution, arbitrary workflow step execution, and test command execution.\n
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the ingested configuration or facts before they influence agent behavior.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata