skills/boazy/skills/adr/Gen Agent Trust Hub

adr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The ADR review workflow described in 'SKILL.md' (Section 5) facilitates an indirect prompt injection attack surface by processing untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches ADR content from Confluence (an external and potentially attacker-controlled source) using scripts/confluence-get.ts.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt provided to the 'ultrabrain' sub-agent interpolates the fetched content directly into the prompt instructions without using delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to read, create, and update pages in the Confluence 'CE' space and execute local shell commands via bunx.
  • Sanitization: The instructions specify converting HTML to readable text, but do not describe any sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the content before it is processed by the AI sub-agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions in 'SKILL.md' rely on executing local TypeScript scripts using bunx tsx and npx tsx (e.g., scripts/adr-report.ts, scripts/adr-sync-emojis.ts). While these scripts are part of the skill's package and perform intended administrative tasks, the reliance on shell execution for routine operations increases the local attack surface.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 04:57 PM