reverse-engineer-rpi
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocesscalls inscripts/reverse_engineer_rpi.pyand various shell scripts to run system tools such asgit,go,file,otool,ldd,strings,rg, andgrep. These tools are used to gather metadata and structural information from the target project being analyzed. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: In binary mode, the skill executes the target binary provided by the user using the
--helpflag to recursively discover commands and subcommands. Although this is gated by a mandatory--authorizedflag and execution is wrapped in a timeout withinscripts/binary/capture_cli_help.sh, it involves running arbitrary code from an external binary. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones external Git repositories using
git clonefrom user-supplied URLs and fetches documentation sitemaps from remote URLs usingurllibinscripts/fetch_url.py. These operations involve connecting to external servers to retrieve untrusted content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from analyzed repositories and binary help output, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. \n
- Ingestion points:
scripts/reverse_engineer_rpi.pyscans repo files and captures binary output. \n - Boundary markers: Absent in generated reports. \n
- Capability inventory:
reverse_engineer_rpi.pyusessubprocess.run,git clone, andurllib.request.urlopen. \n - Sanitization: Absent; content is extracted and interpolated directly into markdown and YAML output files.
Audit Metadata