ecom-image2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow defined in SKILL.md (Step 4) instructs the agent to execute a shell command that interpolates a JSON object containing user-controlled input into a subshell:
bash scripts/imagegen.sh --prompt-file <(echo '<assembled_json>'). This pattern is vulnerable to shell injection if the user input contains single quotes or other shell metacharacters that escape the intended string literal during interpolation.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) as it processes untrusted user descriptions and integrates them into complex prompts for an AI-powered execution tool (Codex). - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via user-provided product descriptions and scene details processed in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The skill uses structured JSON templates in
references/templates/for data organization, but it lacks explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' markers or delimiters to protect against malicious directives hidden in user input. - Capability inventory: The skill has authorized access to the
BashandReadtools, enabling shell execution, local file system manipulation (e.g.,rm -rfin Step 5), and network access viacurlin the generation script. - Sanitization: The wrapper script
scripts/imagegen.shdemonstrates high security maturity by usingjqto safely encode JSON payloads for HTTP requests. However, the recommended CLI workflow in SKILL.md lacks equivalent escaping for direct shell interpolation.
Audit Metadata