ecom-image2

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow defined in SKILL.md (Step 4) instructs the agent to execute a shell command that interpolates a JSON object containing user-controlled input into a subshell: bash scripts/imagegen.sh --prompt-file <(echo '<assembled_json>'). This pattern is vulnerable to shell injection if the user input contains single quotes or other shell metacharacters that escape the intended string literal during interpolation.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) as it processes untrusted user descriptions and integrates them into complex prompts for an AI-powered execution tool (Codex).
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via user-provided product descriptions and scene details processed in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses structured JSON templates in references/templates/ for data organization, but it lacks explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' markers or delimiters to protect against malicious directives hidden in user input.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has authorized access to the Bash and Read tools, enabling shell execution, local file system manipulation (e.g., rm -rf in Step 5), and network access via curl in the generation script.
  • Sanitization: The wrapper script scripts/imagegen.sh demonstrates high security maturity by using jq to safely encode JSON payloads for HTTP requests. However, the recommended CLI workflow in SKILL.md lacks equivalent escaping for direct shell interpolation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 9, 2026, 12:37 PM