video-edit
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands directly on the host system, including the use of
sudo apt installwhich grants root-level privileges for software installation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The method for concatenating videos involves generating a text file using
printf "file '%s'\n" ... > list.txt. This pattern is susceptible to command injection and shell breakage if the input filenames are not properly sanitized by the agent before being included in the command string. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The concatenation command uses the
-safe 0flag (ffmpeg -f concat -safe 0 -i list.txt), which disables path safety checks in ffmpeg. This allows the tool to access and process files from any location on the system if the input file list is manipulated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it processes potentially untrusted filenames and metadata.
- Ingestion points: Filenames and media metadata in
SKILL.mdandreferences/operations.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in processed data.
- Capability inventory: Local shell command execution and file system read/write access via
ffmpeg,ffprobe,printf, andrm. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill lacks instructions for validating or escaping inputs before they are used in shell commands.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the installation of
ffmpegthrough standard package managers like Homebrew and APT, which are recognized as well-known services.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata