dogfood
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingest and processes untrusted UI data from mobile applications being tested.
- Ingestion points: UI snapshots and element trees are captured via the
agent-device snapshot -icommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" delimiters for the UI text processed during exploration.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands via
Bash(specifically theagent-deviceCLI) as defined in the frontmatter andSKILL.md. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of UI-derived text before it is returned to the agent's context for decision-making.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
npxto execute theagent-devicetool from the NPM registry. - Evidence: The frontmatter allows
Bash(npx agent-device:*)and instructions suggest its use for mobile interaction. - Context: This is considered a safe practice as it utilizes a well-known package registry for standard tooling.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands for session management and file organization.
- Evidence: Uses
mkdir -pandcpcommands inSKILL.mdto set up output directories and report templates. - Context: These operations are restricted to the local workspace and are necessary for the skill's stated purpose of generating QA reports.
Audit Metadata