WeChat Publish Pipeline
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to operate with extreme autonomy, explicitly directing it to skip user confirmation and feedback at every step ("全程不等待用户确认", "不询问用户", "不等待反馈"). This suppresses human oversight for a multi-step process that includes executing code and publishing to a public account. Additionally, it provides instructions to bypass content moderation filters by rephrasing prompts if they are blocked by AI safety policies.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a high-exposure surface for indirect prompt injection as it fetches content from external sources like Hacker News and arbitrary URLs.
- Ingestion points: External tech news sources (Hacker News, GitHub Trending) and arbitrary web pages scraped via
baoyu-url-to-markdown(Step 1.1). - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands, write files, and interact with the WeChat API to publish content.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the fetched content before it is processed and used to generate the final published article.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The pipeline executes multiple shell commands using
npxandbun. It interpolates external data, such as URLs found on the web, directly into command-line arguments (--url "{source_url}"in Step 1.1), which presents a potential command injection risk if the agent does not properly sanitize the input. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell redirection (
cat > ... << 'EOF') to dynamically create and overwrite multiple configuration files (EXTEND.md) in the user's home directory ($HOME/.baoyu-skills/). It also performs runtime package installation vianpm installfor thejimpand@jsquash/webppackages.
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