tingwu-asr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits local audio and video files to Alibaba Cloud's Object Storage Service (OSS) for transcription. This behavior is the primary intended function of the skill and targets a well-known cloud service provider.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests and processes untrusted transcription data from a remote API.
- Ingestion points: Audio/video transcription text retrieved via the
getTransResultAPI call inscripts/tingwu.pyandscripts/poll_tasks.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not currently implement specific boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions when formatting the transcription results into Markdown.
- Capability inventory: The generated Markdown is intended to be consumed by other AI skills (e.g.,
funasr-transcribe/summary.py) for summarization and analysis. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the transcribed text content before it is interpolated into Markdown files.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive session cookies for authentication with Alibaba Cloud. It provides scripts (
scripts/login.py,scripts/check_auth.py) and instructions for AI agents to capture and store these cookies locally inconfig/cookies.json. While this is a common pattern for automating web-based services, these cookies represent high-value targets for session hijacking.
Audit Metadata