maestro-verify
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's session initialization logic extracts a phase identifier from user-provided arguments and concatenates it directly into a shell command (
Bash('mkdir -p ${sessionFolder}')). Because the argument parsing logic only removes specific flags and does not sanitize for shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons, pipes, or command substitution), an attacker could provide a malicious argument to execute arbitrary shell commands on the system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from multiple sources and passing it to verification agents.
- Ingestion points: Reads project artifacts including
index.json,plan.json,TASK-*.json, task summaries, and a human-controlleduat.mdfile during Phase 1 and Phase 2. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within these ingested files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities including
Bash,Write,Edit, and the ability to spawn additional agents with unknown constraints viaspawn_agents_on_csv. - Sanitization: Absent. No escaping, validation, or filtering is performed on the content of the artifacts before they are interpolated into the context for verification agents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata