agent-browser
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill's examples and command templates explicitly show embedding plaintext credentials into agent-browser commands (e.g., fill @e4 "password123"), which instructs the LLM to include secret values verbatim in generated output and thus creates an exfiltration risk.
CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
- Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill exposes powerful browser-automation primitives (arbitrary JS eval including iframe context, cookies/localStorage access, network request inspection/mocking, header setting, file upload, screenshotting and credential autofill) that, while legitimate for testing, directly enable credential theft and data exfiltration and can be abused as a backdoor by an attacker controlling the agent.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly instructs the agent to open arbitrary URLs (e.g.,
agent-browser open <url>in SKILL.md) and to runagent-browser snapshot -i -c(references/ai-snapshot-workflow.md) to ingest and act on page content (element labels/HTML), meaning untrusted public web pages can be fetched and their content directly influence the agent's actions.
Issues (3)
W007
HIGHInsecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
E006
CRITICALMalicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
Audit Metadata