long-task
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator ingests untrusted project goals from the
.agent/goal.mdfile and interpolates them into continuation prompts during autonomous loops. - Ingestion points: The
scripts/long_task.pyhelper script reads objective content from.agent/goal.mdto provide context for turn-based continuation. - Boundary markers: The ingested content is enclosed in
<objective>tags, and the agent is explicitly instructed to treat the block as context rather than higher-priority instructions to mitigate override attempts. - Capability inventory: The skill coordinates subagents via the
Agenttool (with worktree isolation), modifies local project files, and executes shell commands. - Sanitization: The objective text is truncated to a 1500-character limit to prevent context window saturation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a bundled Python script (
scripts/long_task.py) to handle lifecycle management and project state operations. - Evidence: The orchestrator invokes this script for tasks such as setting phases, checking status, and installing a 'Stop' hook in the agent platform's local configuration (
settings.json). The script uses secure practices likeshlex.quoteto prevent command injection when building its internal execution strings.
Audit Metadata