write-a-prd
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides templates for shell commands that include placeholders for variables derived from user input or the local environment. Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains commands likegh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/milestones --jq '.[].title',grep -rl "relevant-keyword" docs/solutions/,gh issue list --label research --state closed --search "<feature keywords>" --limit 5, andls ~/.claude/research/<repo-slug>/. Risk: If the agent interpolates these variables without proper escaping or validation, an attacker could provide input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,|,`) to execute arbitrary commands on the system. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads information from local paths, including the user's home directory and the repository's documentation, and transmits this data to GitHub by creating issues and milestones. Ingestion Points:
~/.claude/research/,docs/solutions/, and GitHub issue history. Target: GitHub (a well-known service). While this behavior aligns with the skill's stated purpose, the automated movement of local data to a remote platform should be monitored. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes data from potentially untrusted external sources (Category 8). Ingestion points:
docs/solutions/(Step 4), GitHub issues (Step 4), and research archives in~/.claude/research/(Step 4). Boundary markers: The skill does not define clear delimiters or instructions to the agent to ignore embedded commands within these sources when generating the PRD. Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (gh,grep,ls), read local files, and perform network writes (creating GitHub issues). Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions to sanitize or validate the content retrieved from these external sources before it is included in the final output.
Audit Metadata