aliyun-openclaw-setup-test
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to read
~/.openclaw/openclaw.jsonand check for theDISCORD_BOT_TOKENenvironment variable. These are known locations for sensitive authentication tokens. Accessing these credentials makes them available in the agent's interaction context and may cause them to be recorded in the local output directoryoutput/aliyun-openclaw-setup-test/.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several system commands includingopenclaw doctorandopenclaw gateway statusto validate the environment. The output of these commands, which can contain system-specific metadata and configuration details, is captured and saved to disk.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by consuming data from external sources.\n - Ingestion points: Documentation from
https://docs.openclaw.ai/channels/indexand the output generated by theopenclawCLI.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to prevent the agent from being influenced by potentially malicious instructions contained within the external documentation or CLI outputs.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of reading local files, executing arbitrary shell commands through the
openclawCLI, and performing network requests.\n - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering is applied to the content retrieved from the documentation website or command outputs before processing.
Audit Metadata