config-management

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the sensitive file path ~/.alex/config.yaml to retrieve and store configuration data.
  • This file typically contains sensitive information such as service API keys and agent credentials.
  • The get and list commands provide the agent with the full content of these settings, which can lead to unintended exposure of secrets within the execution context.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the bash tool to execute a Python script (run.py) for processing configuration updates.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion of external file data.
  • Ingestion points: Configuration values are loaded from ~/.alex/config.yaml using the _read_config function in run.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or system instructions to distinguish between configuration data and potential malicious commands embedded in values.
  • Capability inventory: The toolset includes file-write capabilities (set_config), allowing an agent or an attacker to modify the configuration used by other components of the system.
  • Sanitization: While keys are restricted by a regular expression, the values are processed as strings without sanitization, potentially allowing an attacker to inject instructions that the agent might execute if it treats the config as a source of truth.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 1, 2026, 02:53 PM