config-management
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses the sensitive file path
~/.alex/config.yamlto retrieve and store configuration data. - This file typically contains sensitive information such as service API keys and agent credentials.
- The
getandlistcommands provide the agent with the full content of these settings, which can lead to unintended exposure of secrets within the execution context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
bashtool to execute a Python script (run.py) for processing configuration updates. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion of external file data.
- Ingestion points: Configuration values are loaded from
~/.alex/config.yamlusing the_read_configfunction inrun.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or system instructions to distinguish between configuration data and potential malicious commands embedded in values.
- Capability inventory: The toolset includes file-write capabilities (
set_config), allowing an agent or an attacker to modify the configuration used by other components of the system. - Sanitization: While keys are restricted by a regular expression, the values are processed as strings without sanitization, potentially allowing an attacker to inject instructions that the agent might execute if it treats the config as a source of truth.
Audit Metadata