eliteforge-agent-doctor
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/bootstrap_env.pyperforms extensive shell command execution usingsubprocess.run. It invokes system package managers (apt-get,dnf,yum,pacman,zypper,brew,winget,choco) to install software. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill attempts to acquire and use
sudoprivileges. It specifically probes for passwordlesssudo(sudo -n true) and uses it to overwrite protected system files like/etc/hostsand perform system-wide package installations. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates the installation of numerous external dependencies and internal tools at runtime, including
pnpm,pre-commit, and vendor-specific CLIs (eliteforge-poseidon-cli,eliteforge-qingtui-cli). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script reads and evaluates local configuration files that frequently contain sensitive information or credentials, such as
~/.npmrc,~/.pip/pip.conf, and~/.gitconfig(extractinguser.nameanduser.email). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The script contains an indirect prompt injection surface by parsing the
## Environment Variablessection of otherSKILL.mdfiles. It extracts user-controlled descriptions and reports them back to the agent context without sanitization, which could be used to influence the agent's logic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata