skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches skill definitions, frontmatter, and repository content from agentskill.sh and GitHub (raw.githubusercontent.com) to support the research and exploration workflows.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes npx commands to interact with the 'skills' CLI and the vendor-scoped '@codevoyant/agent-kit' for tasks including plan registration, notification, and project scaffolding.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface area for indirect prompt injection as it retrieves and processes content from untrusted external repositories and user-supplied URLs.
- Ingestion points:
workflows/explore.md(Agent B/C fetching GitHub/agentskill.sh content) andworkflows/new.md/workflows/update.md(processing user-provided research URLs via the WebFetch tool). - Boundary markers: The researcher agent prompt (
agents/skill-researcher.md) explicitly instructs the model to be 'completely faithful to the source' and 'not invent, infer, or explore beyond what is written'. - Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing files to the local system, executing shell commands through npx, and spawning multiple subagents with specific model assignments (Opus/Sonnet/Haiku).
- Sanitization: The workflow requires multiple
AskUserQuestionconfirmation steps, ensuring the user reviews and accepts the generated design plans before any permanent file changes or tool installations are performed.
Audit Metadata