eino-component
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the implementation and usage of the
commandlinetool component (github.com/cloudwego/eino-ext/components/tool/commandline), which is designed to allow AI agents to execute shell commands in the host environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The framework described in the skill features a document processing pipeline that ingests data from external, untrusted sources, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Document loaders fetch data from HTTP URLs (
url.NewLoader), AWS S3 buckets (s3.NewS3Loader), and the local file system (file.NewFileLoader), as detailed inreference/document/pipeline.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not demonstrate the use of delimiters or explicit instructions to the model to ignore embedded commands in the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The framework provides high-privilege tools including
commandline(shell execution),httprequest(network access), andbrowseruse(browser automation), which could be targets for manipulation via injected instructions. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering logic for external data is shown in the provided configuration examples.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes instructions to download framework extensions using
go getfrom the author's GitHub repository. It also references the execution of remote packages vianpxwhen configuring Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers (reference/tool/mcp.md). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill supports dynamic content generation and logic evaluation through prompt templates using Go
text/templateand Jinja2 syntax (reference/prompt.md). Additionally, theInvokableToolinterface executes logic based on dynamically generated JSON arguments.
Audit Metadata