lisa-review-project

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a shell command (diff -u) using file paths derived directly from the .lisa-manifest file in the target project. If an attacker provides a manifest containing shell metacharacters such as backticks or command substitution (e.g., $(cmd)), the agent may execute arbitrary commands when attempting to generate a diff.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the target project to drive its logic and reporting.
  • Ingestion points: The .lisa-manifest, package.json, and the content of all files compared during the drift analysis.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate untrusted data from the agent's core instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read arbitrary files, execute subprocesses via the diff command, and write files to the local repository using the Write tool.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the manifest entries or project file contents is performed before they are processed or written back to the source repository.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Adopt Improvements' feature allows the agent to write files from an untrusted target project into the main Lisa source repository. While this requires user confirmation, it provides a mechanism for malicious code to be persisted into the primary template repository if a user is misled by the agent's analysis.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 16, 2026, 11:52 AM