agent-deep-links
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use the
/usr/libexec/PlistBuddyutility to readCFBundleURLTypesfrom application bundles and theopencommand to test URL schemes. These commands are executed locally to verify deep-link support. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines shell command templates in
SKILL.mdandreferences/deep-link-matrix.mdthat use placeholders like<App>and<scheme>. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious user could provide an application name or URL scheme containing shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, command substitution, or semicolons) to execute arbitrary commands. - Ingestion points: User-provided application names or deep-link schemes in the workflow.
- Boundary markers: None provided in the command templates.
- Capability inventory: Execution of
PlistBuddyandopenvia shell. - Sanitization: No instructions are provided to sanitize or validate the user-provided strings before interpolation into shell commands.
Audit Metadata