sentry-triage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to download an installation script from the vendor's domain at
https://composio.dev/install. This is a standard setup procedure for the vendor's tooling. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Uses a piped-to-shell pattern (
curl | bash) to execute the vendor's installation script. It also leveragescomposio runto execute arbitrary JavaScript/TypeScript code fragments and scripts for processing Sentry event data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes the
composioCLI for executing tools andgit showfor inspecting local commits to identify regressions and potential fixes. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the Sentry API, including issue titles, culprit strings, and stack trace frames.
- Ingestion points: Sentry API via
SENTRY_GET_AN_ISSUEandSENTRY_LIST_AN_ISSUES_EVENTS(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present; external data is processed directly as objects in the diagnostic script.
- Capability inventory: File reading (
git show, stack trace mapping), shell execution (composio), and dynamic code execution (composio run). - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of the Sentry event data is described before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata