skill-creator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on the
subprocessmodule to execute external commands. Specifically,run_eval.py,improve_description.py, andrun_loop.pyuse theclaudeCLI to test skill triggering and optimize instructions. Additionally,generate_review.pyuseslsofto manage network ports. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
eval-viewer/generate_review.pyscript starts a local HTTP server on127.0.0.1(port 3117) using Python'sHTTPServer. This server is unauthenticated and serves all files within the workspace directory, including scripts and execution outputs, to allow the user to review agent performance. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data that is later re-processed by the agent or passed to the
claudeCLI. - Ingestion points: Test prompts are ingested from
evals/evals.jsonand user-provided task descriptions inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The scripts use YAML block scalars (
|) when generating temporary skill files for testing to encapsulate descriptions, but provide no specific boundaries for user queries. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via
subprocess, perform file system writes (e.g., to.claude/commands/,feedback.json,grading.json), and run a local network server. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the user-provided prompts before they are executed in the test environment.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The results viewer (
viewer.html) fetches well-known resources from external CDNs, including the SheetJS library fromcdn.sheetjs.comand typography from Google Fonts. These are used for legitimate rendering and data visualization purposes.
Audit Metadata