office-pdf
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several well-known command-line utilities for PDF processing tasks.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandREFERENCE.mddemonstrate the use ofpdftoppm,pdftotext,qpdf, andpdftkfor merging, splitting, and converting documents. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references and utilizes a variety of trusted third-party libraries.
- Evidence: Libraries include
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pypdfium2for Python, andpdf-lib,pdfjs-distfor JavaScript. All are widely recognized, standard tools within the PDF ecosystem. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts text from external PDF files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: PDF content processed in
SKILL.md(e.g., viaPdfReader.pages.extract_text()orpdfplumber.open("document.pdf")). - Boundary markers: Absent; instructions do not explicitly wrap extracted content in delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
qpdfandpdftoppm, and file system write access inoutputs/directory. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill extracts and processes raw text from document streams. The risk is mitigated by mandatory visual verification steps requiring the agent to inspect rendered images of the output document.
Audit Metadata