office-xlsx
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external system utilities to perform spreadsheet processing and visualization tasks.
- Evidence: The
recalc.pyscript utilizessubprocess.runto executesoffice(LibreOffice) to trigger formula recalculation. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructions direct the agent to runsofficefor PDF conversion andpdftoppmfor rendering spreadsheet pages as images. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
recalc.pyscript implements dynamic code generation by creating and installing a LibreOffice Basic macro in the user's application configuration directory. - Evidence: The
setup_libreoffice_macrofunction writes an.xbaXML file containing executable StarBasic code to the standard LibreOffice macro directory (e.g.,~/.config/libreoffice/or~/Library/Application Support/LibreOffice/). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted spreadsheet files which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is ingested into the agent context via
pd.read_excel()andopenpyxl.load_workbook()as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses capabilities including shell command execution (
soffice,pdftoppm), filesystem writes (wb.save), and environment modification (macro installation). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, schema validation, or content filtering for external spreadsheet data is present in the provided files.
Audit Metadata