skills/cshen/skills/xiaomi/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xiaomi

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses uvx to download and run the mijiaAPI package from an external source. The core logic is powered by the Do1e/mijia-api repository, which is an unverified third-party community project rather than an official or verified vendor source.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently executes shell commands (e.g., uvx mijiaAPI set, uvx mijiaAPI get) to manage device properties and query status. This capability is used across all primary features of the skill.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the direct interpolation of user-provided strings into shell command arguments without explicit sanitization or validation logic.\n
  • Ingestion points: User-provided device names, property names, scene IDs, and natural language prompts for the Xiao Ai speaker (SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded content within the user-provided strings.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands and interact with local authentication configuration files (~/.config/mijia-api/auth.json).\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping mechanisms are described to protect against malformed or malicious inputs being passed to the CLI tool.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 07:48 AM