ralph
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/ralph.shscript executes CLI tools (claudeandamp) with the flags--dangerously-skip-permissionsand--dangerously-allow-all. These flags bypass all interactive safety prompts, allowing the autonomous agent to execute any shell command on the host system without user oversight. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection during the conversion of user PRDs into
prd.json. Ingestion points: Project requirements are parsed intoprd.jsonviaSKILL.mdand read by the orchestrator. Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or warnings to treat the JSON data as untrusted. Capability inventory: The agent can read and write files, execute shell commands (for testing and implementation), and perform git operations. Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the PRD content before it drives the agent's actions. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The agent is instructed to 'Implement' and 'Run quality checks' (e.g., tests and linting) based on the contents of the untrusted
prd.json. This facilitates the execution of arbitrary code logic defined by external inputs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/CLAUDE.md, the agent is directed to update project-wideCLAUDE.mdinstruction files. This allows for persistent poisoning, where a compromised session can modify the agent's long-term behavior across different parts of the project codebase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata