ops-go
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands and local binaries (e.g.,
ops-infra,ops-git,ops-unread) at load time using the!commandsyntax. It also runs a bash loop to read project paths from a local registry and extract progress data from markdown files. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a persistence mechanism by using the
CronCreatetool to schedule recurring briefings. It prompts the user to establish daily or weekday execution schedules, allowing the agent to maintain active tasks over time. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external sources, introducing a vulnerability surface where malicious content could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested from WhatsApp messages, Gmail search results, and PR titles.
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,TaskCreate,CronCreate, andWebFetchtools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization for the unread messages and external project data before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves data from the official Google Calendar API via
WebFetchas a fallback mechanism to enrich the briefing data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes shell commands and project-specific CLI tools (
wacli,gog,jq) to aggregate infrastructure, code repository, and communication status.
Audit Metadata