ops-next
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes the
!commandsyntax inSKILL.mdto execute several shell scripts (e.g.,ops-infra,ops-prs) and a bash loop at load time. These commands replace placeholders with their output before the model processes the skill content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests potentially untrusted data from Slack, Linear, and project-specific planning files without using explicit boundary markers or sanitization, creating a surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from Slack searches, Linear issue lists, and local
.planning/STATE.mdfiles. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,WebFetch,Agent(for spawning sub-agents), and task management tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to run commands such asgh pr list,jq, andcatto extract information from the environment and configuration files.
Audit Metadata