pptx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py performs runtime code generation and process injection. It contains an embedded C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) that is written to a temporary location and compiled using gcc to create a shared object. This object is then loaded into the environment via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to hook system calls (socket, listen, accept) in the soffice process.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from .pptx files and extracts text content into the agent context with no sanitization or boundary protection.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/inventory.py extracts text from all shapes; scripts/office/unpack.py extracts raw slide XML.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. Extracted text is presented to the agent as plain text or structured data without "ignore embedded instructions" warnings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has file-write capabilities via scripts/replace.py and arbitrary command execution via subprocess.run calls in multiple scripts.
  • Sanitization: Absent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the subprocess module to execute shell commands.
  • scripts/office/soffice.py executes gcc to compile binary shims.
  • scripts/thumbnail.py and ooxml/scripts/pack.py execute soffice for document conversion.
  • scripts/thumbnail.py executes pdftoppm for image rendering.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires multiple external dependencies from standard registries.
  • Python packages: markitdown[pptx], Pillow, python-pptx (implied).
  • Node.js packages: pptxgenjs, playwright, sharp.
  • System tools: soffice (LibreOffice), pdftoppm (Poppler).
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 11:54 AM