continue-claude-work
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script accesses the
~/.claude/projects/directory to read session index files and conversation transcripts. These files contain historical session data that may include sensitive code, secrets, or workspace details. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script uses the
subprocessmodule to executegitcommands locally, includinggit branch,git status, andgit log, to synchronize the recovered session context with the current repository state. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted historical data from
.jsonltranscripts, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions from previous sessions could influence the current conversation. - Ingestion points: Reads transcripts and summaries from
~/.claude/projects/<project>/<session-id>.jsonl. - Boundary markers: The script identifies compaction boundaries but does not perform sanitization of the extracted text for embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
gitand perform file system reads across the workspace. - Sanitization: Extracted user and assistant text is truncated but not filtered for potential malicious instructions or bypass attempts.
Audit Metadata