agent-teams

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to locate and read SQLite cookie databases from the Microsoft Teams desktop application and various Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge, etc.). This is used to extract session tokens (skypetoken_asm) for authentication. While this involves accessing sensitive application data, it is a documented core feature of the tool.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Extracted authentication tokens are stored in plaintext at ~/.config/agent-messenger/teams-credentials.json. Although the skill sets file permissions to 0600 (owner-only access), the storage of active session tokens on the filesystem presents a risk if the local environment is compromised.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an indirect prompt injection surface by reading content from Microsoft Teams channels which may be controlled by third parties.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the agent-teams message list and agent-teams snapshot commands in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or warnings to the agent regarding embedded instructions in channel messages.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to send messages, upload files, and manage reactions using the agent-teams CLI tool.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of channel message content is described in the provided files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill operates by executing the agent-teams CLI tool (part of the agent-messenger package) through the Bash tool to perform API interactions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 8, 2026, 02:08 AM